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I.  This paper is an attempt at identifying the causes and commonalities of financial 
crises in Latin America over the past fifty years. This identification is carried out 
through an extensive review and analysis  of the literature on causes of twelve major 
financial crises spanning over six major nations in Latin America. In addition, we 
conduct  a Logit Binary Regression on commodity, interest rate and currency indexes 
to determine how closely related shifts in prices of the underlying asset are to times of 
financial crises. Through the literature review, we find the following major 
commonalities among the Latin American financial crises: over-dependence on 
commodities, poor macro and currency policies and overall political instability. Our 
quantitative analysis confirm that these crises are associated with significant shifts in 
the price and value of various commodities, currency and interest rate indices.  
I. Introduction 
 Latin America is a culturally interesting and diverse region in the Western Hemisphere 
that stretches from the tip of South America to the borders of the United States. The region is 
comprised of all countries that were influenced by European powers, with languages derived 
from Latin after the Spanish discovery of the Americas by Christopher Columbus in 1492. Since 
then the region’s constituents have had varied histories with many being marred by political and 
social unrest and numerous ideological shifts in the ruling power. This has caused their economic 
and financial growth to vary drastically throughout the past 120 years. 
 This paper will focus on the drastic downturns in economic growth and financial 
conditions throughout the different countries of Latin America, generally labeled as Economic or 
Financial Crises. Following Kindelberger and Aliber (2005), we define a Financial Crisis a as 





any situation in which some or all financial assets suddenly lose a large part of their nominal 
value 1. Throughout Latin America and the world, most financial crises are associated with 
banking panics or other large-scale recessions, and these recessions and panics have gotten 
significantly more global as the world becomes more and more interconnected. Due to data 
restraints our study will focus predominantly on the past 50 years, covering twelve noteworthy 
financial panics throughout Latin America, starting with the Latin American Debt Crisis of the 
1980’s and continue to today’s ongoing Venezuelan Crisis that began in the early 2010’s. 
 This study intends to determine major commonalities across the twelve different crises as 
well as quickly analyze how the region is positioned in terms of those commonalities. The 
motivation for the study is derived from the author’s interest in financial crises and a lack of 
perceived knowledge of foreign market signals such as the US Treasury Yield Curve in the 
United States for emerging markets. Growing up in a town heavily influenced by Latin American 
immigrants and constantly hearing from friends’ parents about the drastic difference between the 
US economy and their home countries’ economic issues was a large factor in focusing on Latin 
American Crises. The ever-developing complexity of the Latin American economies and the 
seemingly never-ending crises or defaults were also significant factors in the study. The study 
aims to differentiate itself by not only providing a general understanding of what causes financial 
crises in emerging markets, specifically Latin America, but also by identifying commonalities 
between the Crises, highlighting the regions current economic and financial stability in terms of 
those commonalities, as well as testing for procyclical crises signals in Latin America. 
 Latin America’s many financial struggles can be traced far back into the time of 
imperialism and colonial rule. However, this paper will trace the struggles back to the Latin 
 
1 Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber (2005), Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, 5th ed. Wiley, ISBN 0-471-
46714-6 





American Debt Crisis of the 1980’s. This crisis was region wide and effected almost every 
country within Latin America and would later come to be known as La Década Perdida, or the 
Lost Decade. It was kicked off by Mexico announcing that it could not meet its foreign debt 
payment obligations in 19822. This in turn discredited most Latin American economies 
throughout the decade, leading to the popular Lost Decade name. Since the 1980’s, there have 
been eleven more financial crises, directly effecting eight of the largest economies in Latin 
America with Venezuela being the most heavily effected country over this period. The financial 
crises that will be explored throughout this paper are as follows: the Latin American Debt Crisis, 
the Chilean Crisis of 1982, Special Period in Cuba, Mexican Peso Crisis, Venezuelan banking 
crisis of 1994, 1998-99 Ecuadorian financial crisis, the Argentinian Great Depression, the Samba 
effect, the 2002 Uruguay banking crisis, the Venezuelan general strike of 2002-03, the 
Venezuelan banking crisis of 2009-10, the 2014 Brazilian economic crisis, and the ongoing 
Venezuelan crisis. 
II. An Overview of the Crises 
 The financial crisis that initiated the recent spree of crises in Latin America is largely 
agreed to have been the Latin American Debt Crisis of the 1980’s which was later commonly 
referred to as “The Lost Decade” due to the lost economic growth during that decade. Most 
experts agree, with few but notable exceptions, that the crisis was caused by the excess debt 
taken on by Latin American countries in the prior two decades. At the time, most Latin American 
economies were soaring, especially after the oil price increase in the mid to late 1970’s. 
Countries borrowed initially through public routes such as the World Bank and later through 
private banks and would borrow against their future oil revenues, using the capital to finance 
 
2 Hershberg, Eric, and Fred Rosen, eds. Latin America after Neoliberalism. New York: North American Congress on Latin America, 2006. Print. 





infrastructure programs and other 
industrialization needs. Mexico was one of the 
largest culprits as they borrowed against their 
future oil production, valued in US dollars. As 
interest rates increased in the late 70’s the 
payments on the Latin American countries’ 
sovereign debts increased, and the crisis 
ultimately culminated when world trade contracted in 1981 and crude oil prices dropped 
precipitously. On August of 1982, the Mexican Finance minister announced that they would not 
be able to service its debt due to the sharp decreases in oil prices, as seen in Figure 1 showing 
over 100 years of Mexican crude oil prices via Bloomberg to the right, without renegotiating 
payment periods and new loans3. This made creditors aware of the inherent risks with Latin 
American Sovereign debt and essentially froze Latin America’s ability to borrow more capital. 
This caused Latin American countries to not be able to refinance their short-term debt loads they 
could not pay as they had exceeded their earnings power and causing them to default. 
 The debt crisis was the most serious the region of Latin America has seen and caused 
many countries to be forced to work with the International Monetary Fund as well as accept very 
strict covenants on their reissued debt. These covenants forced countries to halt spending on 
social initiatives and push all revenue to the repayment of debt. Income and imports were heavily 
affected as economic growth stagnated for years and unemployment reached recessionary highs. 
In the ten years following 1980, real wages dropped between 20 and 40 percent in many urban 
areas of Latin America4. The intervention by the IMF and the heavy austerity measures put on 
 
3 “Crude Oil Prices from 1861.” Quandl.com, British Petroleum, 19 Aug. 2019, www.quandl.com/data/BP/CRUDE_OIL_PRICES-Crude-Oil-Prices-from-1861. 
4 Felix, David (Fall 1990). "Latin America's Debt Crisis". World Policy Journal. 7 (4): 733–71. 
Figure 1: Mexican Crude Oil Prices 





the countries in order to prevent panic caused domestic unrest as they forced countries to cut 
social programs which has been argued to have pushed citizens to drug trade, prostitution and 
terrorism and continued social unrest for decades. The crisis is largely attributed to enticing 
many Latin American countries to abandon their import substitution industrialization models for 
an export-oriented industrialization that saw them halt the attempt to limit foreign dependence 
through local production in favor of exporting what they had a comparative advantage in and 
importing everything else, normally following the neoliberal economic model strategy that 
includes privatization, globalization, free trade and austerity. 
 The shift away from neoliberal economic policies is thought to be one of the driving 
factors for the Chilean crisis of 1982. Occurring just about at the same time as the Latin 
American Debt Crisis and sometimes thought of as an extension of that Crisis, the Chilean crisis 
of 1982 was the worst economic crisis for Chile since the Great Depression of the 1930’s. The 
Chilean crisis of 1982 is what popularized the Chicago Boys of the 70’s and 80’s as their 
Neoliberal economic strategies were largely adopted in many Latin American countries and led 
to years of prosperity until the pegging of the Chilean peso to the US dollar marked a deviation 
from these policies had disastrous results.  However, those who argue against neoliberal 
economic policies are quick to argue that they were in fact the cause of the Chilean Crisis as they 
led to bank collapses and subsequent bailouts by the government throughout the two years 
leading up to the crisis and believe it is an inherent flaw of the model5. In reality the Crisis was 
most likely brought on by the regional debt crisis unfolding throughout the decade as well as the 
pegging of their currency which caused their currency to be significantly overvalued and 
hampered investment into the country while also being burdened with a heavy debt load.  
 
5 Historia contemporánea de Chile III. La economía: mercados empresarios y trabajadores. 2002. Gabriel Salazarand Julio Pinto. pp. 49–-62. 





 The Special Period in Cuba between 1991 and 2000 was drastically different in causes 
and in repercussions to the country then both of the previous crises. While all three crises were 
significant stagnations for each countries’ economy, the Special Period in Cuba was brought on 
by an extreme shortage of sugar as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union which made up 
roughly 80% of Cuba’s imports and exports6. This drastic reduction in imports and exports 
caused a roughly 34% decline in GDP over the nine-year period and reshaped Cuban life as 
many citizens were required to live without goods they had for decades prior. Oil imports 
dropped to 10% of what they had been pre-crisis and the crisis kicked off a self-dependency 
movement throughout their society. The decrease in Soviet oil caused most other major 
industries to grind to a halt as they depended on the black gold for energy. The societal impacts 
were drastic as waiting for a bus could take three hours, power outages could last up to sixteen 
hours and the average Cuban lost about twenty pounds7. The Special Period in Cuba could be 
considered an outlier in terms of Latin American financial crises as it was brought on by an 
overdependence on an outside country due to political ideologies and global allies being few and 
far between for the small communist regime. 
 The Mexican Peso Crisis was another example of currency induced crisis however it had 
its differences from the Chilean Crisis in the early 1980’s. In short, the crisis was caused by the 
sudden devaluation of the peso against the U.S. dollar in late 1994 largely due to extreme capital 
flight out of Mexico. The Mexican central bank decided to issue short-term debt in Pesos with 
the promise of repayment in US Dollars which invited increases in international capital. This 
couple with Mexico’s signing of the North American Free Trade Act(NAFTA) caused investors 
 
6 Carmen Diana Deere (July–August 1991). "Cuba's struggle for self-sufficiency - aftermath of the collapse of Cuba's special economic relations 
with Eastern Europe". Monthly Review. Archived from the original on 2007-10-07. Retrieved 2020-05-18. 
7 Donovan, Sandy; Rao, Sujay; Sandmann, Alexa L. (2008). Teens in Cuba. Capstone. p. 26. ISBN 9780756538514. Retrieved 18 April 2020. 





to have renewed confidence in the Latin American country until political unrest during the 1994 
election caused investors to implement higher risk premium on Mexican assets.  
The Mexican Central Bank then implemented a series of moves with the intention of maintaining 
the Pesos peg to the Dollar, however this caused investors to recognize an overvalued peso and 
flee Mexican assets causing increased downward pressure on the Peso. The Central Bank’s 
reserves were quickly depleted as they attempted to keep the Peso pegged and soon, they were 
unable to sell new issues of public debt or purchase dollars with the severely devalued Peso and 
they were forced to let the Peso float freely causing even more depreciation. Eventually Mexico 
accepted a $50 billion bailout from the United States and the International Monetary Fund. 
 The economic and financial repercussions were severe as Mexico GDP declined by 
roughly 6% and many banks collapsed revealing low-quality assets. As interest rates rose to keep 
up with the devaluing currency, citizens struggled to keep up with mortgage payments and many 
more defaulted as they were unable to afford regular goods due to the 52% inflation rate Mexico 
was experiencing. Scholars largely agree that one of the main problems with Mexico was its 
attempt to beat the Impossible Trinity in international economics by tampering with their 
monetary policy as they already had a fixed exchange rate and free flow of financial capital8. 
Other scholars argue that the crisis exposed further flaws with the Washington consensus for 
emerging market economies as a privatized banking sector with a liberalized and internationally 
subordinate economy is dependent on foreign inflows of capital to succeed economically9. There 
is no arguing that the Peso Crisis had large impacts on the rest of Latin America as many other 
countries experienced capital outflows after renewed loss of confidence in emerging markets 
 
8 Mankiw, N. Gregory (2013). Macroeconomics, 8th Edition. New York, NY: Worth Publishers. ISBN 978-1-42-924002-4. 
9 Marois, Thomas (2012). States, Banks and Crisis: Emerging Finance Capitalism in Mexico and Turkey. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. ISBN 
9780857938572. 





which would come to be known as the Tequila Effect, something that would happen again with 
another Latin American economy in the coming decade. 
 In the same year as the Mexican Peso Crisis, another financial crisis was unfolding in 
Venezuela, their first of three we will be exploring from this country. The 1994 Venezuelan 
banking crisis can largely be attributed to financial liberalization, lax banking supervision and 
downright fraud. By the end of the crisis, the Venezuelan government had bailed out ten 
Venezuelan banks after 17 of 49 commercial banks failed representing over 50% or the systems 
assets10. This crisis looked somewhat similar to the housing collapse of 2008 in the United States 
as Venezuelan banks were forced to make riskier and riskier loans to keep up with their deposits 
dropping significantly. This coupled with poor oversight and some banks pledging the same cash 
for different loans and accepting the same collateral for multiple loans all were uncovered after 
the drastic drop in oil prices resulted in decreased consumer and governmental spending. This 
crisis was largely attributable to poor regulation and even poorer decision making throughout the 
financial crisis but also shared a trigger of decreased commodity pricing being the catalyst. 
 Fast forward four more years and the next financial crisis in Latin America was 
unfolding, this time in Ecuador. What was unfolding in Ecuador at this time was nothing short of 
a perfect storm for the country as they experienced a banking crisis, currency crisis, sovereign 
debt and political crisis all at roughly the same time. The country had undergone significant 
financial sector liberalization throughout the 90’s which had the same effect as they had in 
Venezuela, riskier loans backed by the belief that well connected recipients would be bailed out 
by their government connections. The liberalization did allow easier access to international 
capital which banks then began engaging in US dollar denominated banking which left the 
 
10 Molina, C.A. (2002), "Predicting bank failures using a hazard model: the Venezuelan banking crisis", Emerging Markets Review, Volume 3, 
Issue 1, 10 April 2020  





country susceptible to exchange rate fluctuations. The shocks that ultimately tested these 
weaknesses were a sharp decrease in oil prices, strain on the agricultural sector due to an 
unusually strong El Niño which caused defaults totaling close to 13% of the country’s GDP. The 
two drastic decreases in commodity revenue caused further defaults and runs on the national 
banks causing further strain on the banking sector11. A capital flight from emerging markets due 
to the political and financial strain on Ecuador and other emerging markets lead to tighter 
lending to the country and the Ecuadorian Sucre to depreciate heavily against the dollar. The 
government eventually bankrupted on their sovereign debt as they struggled to support deposit 
guarantees and the central banks expansionary policies. The catalysts for the crisis was very 
similar to the previous five crises however, the exact causes were a mix of similar and very 
different causes as this is the first one to be largely caused by a strengthening weather pattern but 
shares the financial corruption and currency manipulation causes which left Ecuador in a 
recession for the better half of two years. 
 The late 1990’s and early 2000’s would shape up to be a tumultuous few years for Latin 
American financial systems as Ecuador would soon be followed by Argentine, Uruguay and 
Brazil all in somewhat of a financial contagion. Argentina was the next economy to succumb to 
the struggles as the Argentinian Great Depression of 1998-2002 kicked off in the third quarter of 
1998. Argentina had struggled over the previous two decades since the aforementioned Latin 
American Debt Crisis of the 1980’s to stabilize their economy and regularly dealt with extreme 
hyperinflation. The widely cited three main contributors to the financial crisis in Argentina were 
the fixed exchange rate between Argentine peso and the US dollar, large amounts of borrowing 
 
11 "Ecuador and the IMF -- Address by Stanley Fischer". www.imf.org. Retrieved 2020-04-17. 





by the government, and reduced tax revenues due to the decrease in oil prices12. Other reasons 
largely cited are the lack of fiscal discipline my the government as well as financial contagion as 
the flight from emerging markets due to the crisis in other Latin American economies, Russia, 
and Asia all put pressure on the Argentinian Peso further crippling the government’s ability to 
pay down their sovereign debt. The pegging and unpegging of the Argentinian Peso also added 
significant stress to the exchange rate during the crisis that is wildly cited as uneducated and 
unnecessary strain to the economy. Overall, Argentina’s continued economic troubles all 
convened at an inconvenient time and crippled the economy.  
 The crisis in Argentina quickly spilled over into Uruguay as they suffered a large banking 
crisis in 2002. The crisis was largely attributed to the run on depositors largely from foreign 
investors, specifically from Argentina as their currency problems deepened. The crisis showed 
the country’s overdependence on Argentina which caused a deep contraction in their economy. 
Approximately 33% of the country's deposits were taken out of the financial system and five 
financial institutions were left insolvent13. Uruguay was largely criticized for their response as it 
was deemed inadequate and slow and could have lessened the financial strain on the system. The 
crisis left many depositors in Uruguay and neighboring Argentina and Brazil in dire economic 
conditions as Uruguay did not have adequate depositors’ insurance at the time. This crisis was 
built off other regional crises at the time and helped deepen others during the same period. 
 The final crisis of the late 90’s and early 2000’s was what would later be known as the 
Samba Effect in Brazil. Much like the Tequila Effect explored earlier during the Mexican Peso 
Crisis of the early 1990’s, the Samba effect was a large drop in the value of the Brazilian Real 
 
12 Luna, Daniel (20 December 2001). "Argentina's Crisis Explained". TIME. Archived from the original on 1 September 2012. Retrieved 19 
April 2020. 
13 Atchugarry, ten years after the crisis 





due to capital outflows from the region beginning in 1999. These outflows are largely attributed 
to the other crises unfolding in Asia and Russia and the increasing of US interest rates. All these 
caused foreign investors to put increased premiums on Brazilian and in turn Latin American 
asset return rates. Brazils stance as the largest economy in South America and Latin America 
showed how dependent other countries were on Brazil. During the crisis Brazil also tried to 
increase interest rates and cut spending and tax increases in an attempt to maintain the value of 
its currency, however this would prove to fail as it went against the impossible trinity of 
macroeconomic policy14. Fears that the other emerging market crisis would quickly spread to 
Latin America lead Brazil to adopt austerity measures and accept a $40 billion bailout from the 
IMF. The Samba Effect is largely regarded to have dissipated by the turn of the new millennia, 
as had many of the contagious financial crisis of the 1990’s. 
 After the contagion crises of the 1990’s and early 2000’s, Venezuela began to take center 
stage again beginning with their general strike of 2002-2003. In response to political unrest and 
the desire for then President Hugo Chavez to step down, 18,000 state oil employees staged a 
strike lasting three months. Oil, much like in other Latin American countries, plays a main role 
in Venezuela’s economy and strike cost the oil industry $13 billion and the country's GDP fell 
27% in the start of 200315. The lockout had other economic and financial implications as 
unemployment neared 20% and Venezuela defaulted on their oil contracts for the first time ever. 
Luckily this crisis was short lived and did not have the far-reaching implications the last few had. 
It still shows a perfect example how dependence on commodities and poor political stability has 
been an overarching theme throughout Latin America’s financial and economic history. 
 
14 "Bearing the Burden: The Impact of Global Financial Crisis on Workers and Alternative Agendas for the IMF and Other Institutions", Institute 
for Policy Studies, April 2000. 
15 Jones, Bart (2008), Hugo! The Hugo Chavez Story from Mud Hut to Perpetual Revolution, London: The Bodley Head 





 The General Strike of 2002-2003 was only the tip of the iceberg for Venezuela as a few 
years later they would suffer another financial crisis of the banking kind that would persist in 
some aspects to this day. The Venezuelan banking crisis of 2009-2010 saw the government take 
over twelve Venezuelan banks totaling over 12% of total deposits16. The takeovers were largely 
due to financial liberalization, corruption and poor oversight within the financial sector. The 
repercussions from this are largely not totally known as shortly after the current Venezuelan 
Crisis began that has been affecting the country and economy for an entire decade. It is largely 
politically driven as the ruling party of Chavez and Maduro have done anything they can to stay 
in power. The crisis has been likened to a war-time economy and regularly ranks near the bottom 
of all financial and economic lists; however, the country has stopped releasing data points and all 
that can be formulated are estimates. The unrest has led to significant pull back in the 
Venezuelan economy as many foreign firms have pulled out entirely due to safety reasons. Most 
airlines with the exception of those from Turkey and Russia have pulled out of the country and 
international capital has all but seized entirely due to capital constraints imposed by foreign 
governments. This is extremely different than most other crisis we have looked at as the data 
simply is not there and there is a large humanitarian aspect. However, it largely encompasses the 
political risk inherent with Latin America over the past four decades that have caused many of 
the crisis we have explored. 
 The final financial crisis that will be looked at is also still ongoing, and that is the 2014 
Brazilian Economic Crisis. Between 2015 and 2016, Brazil saw their GDP shrink by over 6% 
due to a number of economic, financial and political reasons. The crisis started when commodity 
prices for a number of Brazilian exports decreased drastically along with the foreign demand for 
 
16 BusinessWeek, 14 June 2010, Venezuela Seizes Banco Federal for ‘Grave’ Weakness 





these commodities specifically from China. The second main factor was internal and had to do 
with the macroeconomic policies adopted by the new Government who adopted fiscally 
contractionary policies while still expanding without realizing the expansion was heavily 
influenced by government stimulation of wages and consumption spending. With less revenue 
the government needed to cut back on public spending thus decreasing the drivers they had for 
growth. Experts believe about 30% of the problem was caused externally due to demand and 
price decreases in exports and the remaining 70% was caused by political instability between 
new regimes and poor macroeconomic policies17.  
III.   Literature Review 
 There has been a significant amount of papers written on Latin America in terms of both 
crises and the overall structure of the economy. Reviewing each individual piece of literature 
would be next to impossible. For this paper, a review of relevant articles pertaining to the causes 
of Latin American financial crises and the structure of Latin American economics and finance 
was completed. The works span over thirty years from various points of view in an attempt to 
capture as wide a range of ideas and studies as possible. 
The paper, “Financial Reverberations: The Latin American Banking System During the 
Mid-1990s” by Walter Thomas Molano was written in 1998 and examines the fiscal and 
monetary responses to Latin American financial crises throughout the 1990’s. The paper cites 
liberalization of the banking sector and a surge of capital inflow to a banking system too loosely 
regulated and susceptible to shocks as the major causes of the volatile 1990’s18. Molano argues 
that governments that led pro-market policy responses registered the lowest fiscal and 
macroeconomic costs, while those that pursued non-market responses registered the highest 
 
17 FGV (2016-05-05). A Crise de Crescimento do Brasil (in Portuguese). Elsevier Brasil. ISBN 9788535266382. 
18 Molano, Walter Thomas, Financial Reverberations: The Latin American Banking System During the Mid-1990s (August 1997).  





costs. The Argentine government implemented a pro-market approach and spread the cost of the 
bailout across shareholders and depositors it ultimately prevented worse macroeconomic 
outcomes that would be seen in Mexico and Venezuela due to their non-market approaches. 
Tomasz Korol wrote the paper, “Early warning models against bankruptcy risk for 
Central European and Latin American enterprises”, in 2012 that attempted to forecast the 
bankruptcy risk of companies in both Europe and Latin America. This paper was helpful in 
developing a working model for the current study of Latin American economies as it helped 
explain some of the variables at work in enterprise bankruptcies. The study looked at sixty 
companies listed in Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Brazil and Chile as well as over one hundred listed 
in Eastern Europe19. The two different regions were used to control for structural differences 
within economies from various areas of the world. A more statistical and flushed out model was 
utilized in this study and it isn’t directly applicable to the study of our paper, however it was 
instrumental in the development of this studies model. 
“Banking Crises in Latin America: Experiences and Issues” is a book by Liliana Rojas-
Suarez and Steven R. Weisbrod  published in 1996. In the book, the authors argue that the 
financial crises in Latin America are significantly different than in other regions due to regional 
nuances that create specific circumstances needed for more frequent and severe crises. These 
differences consist of lower financial intermediation, investors being less willing to commit 
long-term funds and higher volatility within deposit markets. Additionally, the accounting 
standards are weak to nonexistent and the legal framework of financial markets is years behind 
other established regions20. The biggest takeaway from the paper is the importance of 
 
19 Tomasz Korol, Early warning models against bankruptcy risk for Central European and Latin American enterprises, Economic Modelling, 
Volume 31, 2013, Pages 22-30, ISSN 0264-9993, 
20 Rojas-Suárez Liliana, & Weisbrod, S. R. (1996). Banking crises in Latin America: experience and issues. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American 
Development Bank, Office of the Chief Economist. 





liberalization with regulations and the necessity for Latin American specific solutions to Latin 
American financial crises. 
 Ernesto Talvi wrote the article “Thirty-five years of recurring financial crises in Latin 
America: Toward a new (and better) paradigm?” as an op-ed for Brookings. His article spoke 
about the rise of the Washington consensus in the early 1980’s in Latin America. The 
Washington Consensus was built on the pillars of “macroeconomic discipline, trade and financial 
openness of the economy, market deregulation, and privatization of state-owned enterprises”21.  
The article goes on to argue that a pillar has been missing and that there should be an 
international lender of last resort for emerging market economies because the large flight of 
capital that comes with minor shocks to the regional economies makes the crises far worse than 
they need to be. Talvi ends his article stating how the changes to the international finance 
architecture has allowed Latin America to make giant leaps in terms of their ability to deal with 
future financial crises and hope that they will be far less prevalent moving forward. 
 The Currency Game: Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America is a book written in 2002 
by Frieden and Stein. The book explores relationship between politics and the economy in Latin 
America, specifically in terms of currency and interest rate policies. The overall findings in the 
book are that there are clear patterns between economic stability and currency and interest rate 
decisions. However, at times elections and special interests play a larger role in these decisions22. 
The authors argue that there needs to be significantly more research to determine the effect of 
politics on the economy and political economies overall in Latin America. This article helped in 
 
21 Talvi, E. (2016, July 28). Thirty-five years of recurring financial crises in Latin America: Toward a new (and better) paradigm?  
22 Frieden, J. A., & Stein, E. (2002). The currency game: exchange rate politics in Latin America. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American 
Development Bank. 





the understanding of how politics at times affects the decision making behind seemingly 
inappropriate fiscal and monetary policies during and not during crises.  
 One of the most relatable pieces of literature reviewed for this paper was the article 
“Commodity Prices and the Business Cycle in Latin America: Living and Dying by 
Commodities?” written by Camacho and Perez-Quiros in 2014. In the paper they analyze the 
interactions between commodity prices and GDP growth of the largest Latin American 
economies. The countries they looked at were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, 
and Venezuela using a Markov-switching impulse response function23. One of the interesting 
things they found was that shocks to commodity prices also tend to lead to regime shifts which 
add to financial crises. The authors recommend some type of countercyclical stabilization policy 
to be implemented. 
 Given the prior literature there appears to be three main causes throughout all thirteen 
financial crises. The first commonality among the financial crises is the prevalence of unstable 
governments. The Latin American region is well known for having a tumultuous political history 
over the past century and the unrest has led to constant financial and economic problems and 
crises in the region. The instability of the government adds to the second commonality of poor 
macroeconomic and exchanger rate policy decisions. This can be seen in the Mexican peso crisis 
among other crises where the central bank and government took steps that inadvertently made 
the crisis far worse than it needed to be. The final commonality among the studied financial 
crises was an overdependence on commodity exports among countries. This left many of the 
countries susceptible to swings in the prices of those commodities that could quickly decimate an 
unregulated economy. 
 
23 Maximo Camacho & Gabriel Perez-Quiros (2014) Commodity Prices and the Business Cycle in Latin America: Living and Dying by 
Commodities?, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 50:2, 110-137, DOI: 10.2753/REE1540-496X500207 





 The remainder of the paper examines the circumstances above on a quantitative basis to 
establish whether changes in commodities, exchange rates or interest rates effects the likelihood 
of financial crises.  
IV.  Methodology and Data 
For the quantitative analysis the study used a Logit Binary Regression Model to run a 
logistic function to model a binary dependent variable. The point of the model is to determine the 
effect of each independent variable on the control variable of financial crisis. The formula and 
explanation can be found below: 
𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔/(𝟏 − 𝑭𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔)) = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑪𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒆 𝑶𝒊𝒍 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑪𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓 
+ 𝜷𝟑 𝑰𝒓𝒐𝒏 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑮𝒐𝒍𝒅 + 𝜷𝟓 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚  
 The model treats financial crises as a yes/no binary choice and each independent 
variable will produce an odds ratio that shows the percentage change each corresponding 
percentage change in the variable would increase or decrease the likelihood of a financial crisis. 
The variables chosen were a mixture of commodities, rates and currency values to capture the 
bulk of what the qualitative research showed were commonalities between Latin American 
Financial crises. These variables were chosen as the region is heavily dependent on commodity 
exports as shown in the research done above. Interest rates and currency exchange rates were 
chosen as exchange rates are important in commodity-based economies and interest rates are 
crucial to any economy. The findings from this model will be paired with the qualitative 
research to present a fuller understanding of what is at work in Latin America. 
The study period covered the years 1970-2020.  For this period, monthly price data was 
sourced from a variety of resources including Bloomberg, Federal Reserve Economic Data, and 
numerous Latin America central banks databases. Bloomberg was important in getting historical 





prices for Latin American exports in the commodities sector such as the price of gold, iron, 
copper and crude oil. The Federal Reserve Economic Data was integral in getting currency 
exchange rates to US dollars. The paper used the largest economies in Latin America and their 
central bank databases to access the sovereign debt interest rates over the past fifty years. The 
data for each variable represents the price or percent of each of the underlying assets. These 
assets were chosen after lengthy qualitative research that aimed to answer the question of what 
has caused Latin American financial crises in the past. These assets were promising measures of 
commonalities between crises.   
V. Results 
 The findings of the paper will be split into two sections, the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects. The qualitative conclusions were found after extensive research of prior literature on 
each individual crisis as well as the region as a whole. The findings were somewhat predictable 
but at times surprising. The best explanation for financial crises in Latin America is that they are 
caused by a mixture of political instability within the region, inept policy makers when it comes 
to currency and macroeconomic decisions and an overreliance on commodity exports that put the 
regional economies at risk of financial contagion. 
 The first commonality amongst Latin American Financial Crises was that of some form 
of political instability. One would imagine it was more prevalent in the early years of the papers 
study and has subsided since then but that is not the case as most, if not all, of the recent crises in 
the past ten years have had some aspect of political instability involved. This instability can be as 
simple as a democratic shift in the leading party that coincide with another catalyst for chaos or 
messy coups and oustings of current leaders such as Brazil’s Crisis in the late 2010’s. This 
observation is somewhat predictable as instability within politics makes foreign investors slow to 





be willing to increase their exposure in fear of regime changes or drastic shifts in the treatment of 
foreign investors by the current regime. Venezuela as of late is a perfect example of how 
political instability without regime changes can have drastic effects on crises within the country. 
 The second commonality amongst Latin American Financial Crises is a general 
ineptitude amongst politicians in terms of appropriate macro and currency based economic 
decisions. The easiest place to see this is in the regions general lack of understanding of what is 
known as the trilemma of international finance that states it is impossible to have a fixed foreign 
exchange rate, free capital movement and an independent monetary policy at the same time24. 
The theory was proposed in the late 20th century by John Fleming and Robert Mundell largely 
based on empirical studies and observations. The Latin American region is a perfect area to see 
this theory in action as over half of the crises looked at stemmed from poor monetary policy, 
starting with the Mexican Peso Crisis in the late 1980’s as Mexico tried to peg their currency to 
the U.S. dollar, maintain free capital flow into and out of the country and fend off recessionary 
signals through independent monetary policy. They ultimately failed bringing much of the 
confidence investors had for all of Latin American economies with them and every country to try 
the same since has failed. 
 The final major commonality found in Latin American Financial Crises was the over-
dependence on commodity exports. This is found around almost all third world and emerging 
market economies and is usually the ultimate shock to the economy that leads to a full-blown 
crisis. Much of Latin America is resource rich in many high demand commodities such as crude 
oil, copper, iron and gold with large percentages of each countries’ GDP attributed to these 
industries. This leaves the economies susceptible to sudden decreases in commodity prices which 
 
24 Boughton, James M. (2003). "On the Origins of the Fleming-Mundell Model" (PDF). IMF Staff Papers. 50 (1): 1–3. Retrieved 17 April 2019. 





affect the banking and financial systems through loan defaults. In emerging economies, many 
banks will give loans with future revenue as collateral and as revenue declines so too does the 
companies’ ability to pay back those loans. Almost every financial crisis observed in this paper 
was either affected by or coincided with a price collapse in commodity prices from the 
Uruguayan Banking Crisis to the most recent Brazilian Financial Crisis. 
 The findings from the quantitative analysis, seen below, are consistent with the 
qualitative research above. The table below is broken up into seven different columns, but the 
three most important are the variable column, the odds ratio column and the P value column. The 
variable column is the first column  in the table and shows what variable is being tested to give a 
binary outcome of crisis vs. no crisis as the underlying value of the asset changes. The Odds 
Ratio is a ratio that shows the percentage increased likeliness of a financial crises given an 
increase in the 
 
underlying asset. The P value column shows how accurate the results are in terms of outliers 
with a P score of 0 being ideal. With this in mind it becomes clear that currency, interest rates 
and crude oil prices coincide with financial crises better than the other variables tested. What this 
data shows is that there could be a strong connection between these assets and financial crises in 
Latin America.  
 There are a few shortfalls with the model that should be noted with these conclusions. For 
starters, the paper had no way of distinguishing between correlation and causation on a 





quantitative basis. Some of this can be cleaned up with the pairing of qualitative research and 
understanding when prices of certain assets changed in relation to the onset of a financial crisis. 
Secondly, the databases used were as complete as possible, however they are only as reliable as 
the sources. Bloomberg and FRED were incredible resources but the Central Bank databases in 
Latin America were at times incomplete and cumbersome to deal with. Overall, pairing the 
qualitative and quantitative research together gives a good understanding that Financial Crises in 
Latin America can be attributed to political instability, inept decision making in terms of 
macroeconomic policy and over reliance on commodity exports. 
VI. Conclusion 
After extensive research this paper has put forth the argument that Latin American 
Financial Crises can be attributed to a large number of causes but share some commonalities 
between them. Many crises are caused by political upheaval.  Whether through regime changes 
or through military intervention. Crises can also be started or worsened by poor macroeconomic 
policy decisions, specifically when it comes to a nation’s currency and its monetary and fiscal 
policies. One of the strongest front runners of financial crises in Latin America is the prices of 
commodities that the region exports such as crude oil. This paper is not trying to claim that these 
are the sole causes of financial crises but rather that amongst a large population of crises, these 
causes stood out as repeat offenders.  
These findings could be important for a number of reasons. The most obvious one is the 
ability this knowledge would give someone in understanding the region on a financial and 
economic level. Being aware of these causes could help foreign investment know when to pull 
out or lessen exposure to the region with confidence. The knowledge could also help the region 
themselves understand why it has been plagued with so many crises in the past half century. A 





strong argument can be made that during these crises, support from outside countries such as the 
United States doesn’t address the underlying issues and just gets the countries out of debt enough 
to keep going. Latin American financial crises should be fixed with Latin American tailored 
policy changes such as shifting away from such a heavy dependence on commodity exportation 
or working to understand the trilemma of international finance and sticking to just two mandates. 
In terms of where the region stands now in terms of these commonalities, the answer 
would be much different if this paper was being written six months ago. As it stands, some 
commodity prices such as crude oil have taken a nosedive in recent months to almost historic 
lows while others such as gold have reached historic highs. Political stability in some countries 
has never been stronger while in some countries such as Venezuela, Chile and Brazil cracks are 
beginning to form in the regimes and the publics opinions of them. The outbreak of Covid-19 led 
to an initial flight of capital from emerging markets during the pullback in February and March 
however, things have seemed to steady at least for now. Latin America stands at the precipitous 
of either a miraculous turnaround in a few decades in their ability to handle financial crises or 
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